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Advertising plays an important role in the capitalist economic system and
its various modified versions. That role is to provide meaningful information
about products to consumers so that they can make rational choices among
competing products. To the extent that it performs this role, advertising is
functioning properly; to the extent that it does not, it is malfunctioning. De-
ceptive advertising is an outstanding example of this malfunctioning because it
provides misinformation rather than information to the consumers. It should be
prevented because it is harmful not only to consumers, but also to honest busi-
nessmen, advertising effectiveness, and the public image of marketing in general.
The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) regulation of advertising repre-
sents the most significant form of governmental control in this area.' Broadly
speaking, this control consists of two major phases: (1) detecting and establish-
ing the existence of deceptive advertising, and (2) fashioning remedies designed
to deter and correct abuses. The FTC has approached neither of these phases
with anything remotely resembling an objective methodology.2
This article is intended to describe such an approach and document its ap-
plication to the facts of one of the most-if not the most-significant deceptive
advertising cases: Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC.' Before doing so, a brief over-
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill;
J.D., 1973, Yale University.
** Assistant Professor of Business and Economics at North Carolina A. & T. at Greensboro;
Ph.D., 1977, University of North Carolina.
1 When considerations of health or safety are not directly involved, and the fraud
is not so blatant that criminal sanctions can be sought, the FTC is virtually the
sole effective protector of defrauded consumers in this area of the law. Section 5
of the FTC Act, conferring jurisdiction over "unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in commerce . . ." and Section 12, dealing with the false advertisement of food,
drugs, devices, and cosmetics, constitute an exceptionally broad grant of power in
the FTC to deal with deceptive advertising. State advertising laws, private damage
actions, and competition among advertisers are not now practical alternatives.
Report of the American Bar Association Commission to Study the Federal Trade Commission,
40 (1969).
2 Given the general tendency of the various affected groups (e.g., advertisers, government
officials, consumers, and commentators) to disagree on sensitive issues such as deceptive ad-
vertising, it is interesting to note the widespread agreement that consumers' understanding of
allegedly deceptive advertisement should be objectively assessed. See Gellhorn, Proof of Con-
sumer Deception Before the Federal Trade Commission, 17 KAN. L. REv. 559 (1969) (writ-
ten by a law professor); Pollay, Deceptive Advertising and Consumer Behavior: A Case for
Legislative and Judicial Reform, 17 KAN. L. Rav. 625 (1969) (written by a marketing
professor); Jones, The FTC's Need for Science Research, Proceedings, 2nd Annual Conference,
Association for Consumer Research 1 (1971) (written by a government official); Dillon, How
the FTC Stacks the Deck, Paper Presented at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American
Association of Advertising Agencies (1973) (written by a president of an advertising agency).
See note 130 infra.
3 Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
1575 (1978).
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view of the Commission's methods of detecting and proving deceptive advertising
will be provided by way of background. Then the article will examine in some
detail the history of and the authority for the FTC's controversial use of cor-
rective advertising. Finally, an objective test-one that can be used not only to
detect deceptive advertising but also to determine when corrective advertising has
accomplished its purpose-will be presented.
II. Detecting and Proving Deceptive Advertising
The determination of the presence of deceptive advertising4 by the FTC
and the courts usually involves four substantive questions.5 First, what con-
sumer intelligence level should be used as the standard for evaluating the repre-
sentation made by the advertisement. Second, what standards should be used in
determining the representation actually made by the advertisement. Third, what
method should be employed to ascertain the truth or falsity of the advertise-
ment's representation. Finally, assuming a false representation, what degree of
materiality should be required before action is taken. These" questions will be
briefly discussed' in light of the methods employed by the Commission to detect
and determine the existence of proscribed deceptive advertising.
In order to determine the deceptiveness of any advertisement, the relevant
level of consumer intelligence must first be selected. In the early cases, the
standard commonly used was whether the advertisement would be likely to de-
ceive the "average purchaser."' In 1937, however, the Supreme Court in FTC v.
Standard Education Society' lowered thetandard, holding:
The fact that a false statement may be obviously false to those who are
trained and experienced does not change its character, nor take away its
4 With one exception, there is no general statutory definition of deceptive advertising:
Congress preferred to leave the application and interpretation of the term to the Federal Trade
Commission, subject to review by the courts. This exception is § 15(a) (1) of the Wheeler-
Lea Amendments to the FTC Act of 1914, (Federal Trade Commission Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. §
41 (1970)) which defines the term "false advertising" for the purpose of § 12 (15 U.S.C. § 52
(1970)) (prohibiting any "false advertisement . . . for the purpose of inducing . . . the
purchase of foods, drugs, devices, or cosmetics") as:
The term "false advertisement" means an advertisement, other than labeling,
which is misleading in a material respect; and in determining whether any advertising
is misleading, there shall be taken into account (among other things) not only
representations made or suggested by statement, word, design, device, sound, or
any combination thereof, but also the extent to which the advertisement fails to
reveal facts material in the light of such representations or material with respect to
consequences which may result from the use of the commodity to which the ad-
vertisement relates under the conditions prescribed in said advertisement, [or under
such advertisement,] or under such conditions as are customary or usual. No ad-
vertisement of a drug shall be deemed to be falsa if it is disseminated only to members
of the medical profession, contains no false representation of a material fact, and
includes, or is accompanied in each instance by truthful disclosure of the formula
showing quantitatively each ingredient of such drug.
5 Gellhorn, supraz note 2, at 561.
6 It is not the authors' intent to discuss these matters in any detail nor with any degree
of comprehensiveness, but rather to merely provide the reader with sufficient background for
the proposals that are made within. For a fuller discussion, see Millstein, The Federal Trade
Commission and False Advertising, 64 COLUm. L. REy. 439 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Millstein]; Developments in Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005 (1967);
Gellhorn, supra note 2.
7 Ostermoor and Co. v. F.T.C., 16 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1927).
8 302 U.S. 112 (1937).
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power to deceive others less experienced. There is no duty resting upon
a citizen to suspect the honesty of those with whom he transacts business.
Laws are made to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious. The best
element of business has long since decided that honesty should govern
competitive enterprises, and that the rule of caveat emptor should not be
relied upon to reward fraud and deception. 9
After this decision, the Commission lowered its intelligence standard. The new
standard was reflected in Aronberg v. FTC:" "The law is not made for experts
but to protect the public-that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the
unthinking, and the credulous-who, in making purchases, do not stop to
analyze but too often are governed by appearances and general impression."'
This approach was carried to its extreme in Gelb v. FTC" where the FTC
prohibited a claim that a hair product "could color hair permanently." When
appealed, the Commission's order was affirmed, the court stating:
It seems scarcely possible that any user of the preparation could be so
credulous as to suppose that hair not yet grown out would be colored by an
application of the preparation to the head. But the Commission has con-
strued the advertisement as so representing it, and so construed it is false.
One witness was found who by dint of much prodding was finally induced
to testify "that you would think 'permanent' means you would never need to
bother having it dyed again," although she herself knew better. Since the Act
is for the protection of the trusting as well as suspicious, as stated in FTC v.
Standard Education Society, . . . we think the order must be sustained on
this point.1
3
According to one commentator, the Gelb decision "indeed represents the
ultimate in literal construction of an advertisement: if anyone of any intelligence
level could find and believe a misleading connotation, the advertiser apparently
must be prepared to defend that connotation."' 4 The Commission, however, has
not always been successful in its use of the lowest standard of intelligence. There
have been reversals from time to time; but the courts generally have been quite
tolerant of the low intelligence level used by the FTC."
Once the relevant level of consumer intelligence has been selected, the
meaning of the advertisement must be ascertained. The Commission has adopted
a htimber of ground rules 6 which it applies to the advertisement by relying
either upon its own views of the meaning of evidence introduced either by itself
or by the respondent-advertiser. Such evidence has included dictionary defini-
tions, consumer testimony, expert witnesses, and consumer surveys.' To date,
9 Id. at 116.
10 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942).
11 Id. at 167.
12 144 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1944).
13 Id. at 582.
14 Millstein, supra note 6, at 460. See also 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005 (1967), supra note 6, at
1041.
15 Millstein, supra, note 6, at 460 n.93.
16 These ground rules are discussed in Milstein, supra note 6, at 465-70. See also 80 HARv.
L. REv. 1005 (1967), supra note 6, at 1043-51.
17 See Millstein, supra note 6, at 476-78; Gellhorn, supra note 2, at 564-67.
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however, the use of consumer surveys has been infrequent.18 Generally, the FTC
has neither the funds, manpower, time nor desire to conduct consumer surveys. "
This reluctance might be due in part to the possibility that a survey done by its
staff could be rejected by a court as not credible.2" Instead, the FTC prefers to
use the findings of the respondent's survey as evidence to prove its own point. For
example, in Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC,2 the respondent's survey was intro-
duced to show that 91 % of 300 surveyed consumers were not misled by ad-
vertisements of Imdrin, a palliative for arthritis or rheumatism. The Commis-
sion relied on the evidence that 9% of those questioned were misled in proving
the deceptive nature of the respondent's advertisement.
Surveys conducted by a respondent, such as in Rhodes, are rarely beneficial
to that party. These surveys are suspect because of their vested interest and
entail a risk of non-use or counter-use by the Commission that must be balanced
against their cost. 2 Non-use generally results from some impropriety in the
survey. In one case,2" a survey of over two thousand "independent tobacco
experts" was made in order to prove that this group preferred Luckies two to
one. Over one thousand were in fact reported to be smoking the brand, but it
was discovered that at least one hundred of the four hundred questioned smoked
other brands as well as Luckies and that many had received gratuitous cig-
arettes from the company.
After a representation is shown to be false, the next (and last) step is to
determine whether it is "material" or not. The FTC Act has been interpreted
to bar only material untruths in advertising-those capable of affecting purchas-
ing decisions. 4 The courts have been critical of FTC decisions when the ad-
vertisement, although false, does not appear likely to result in injury to the public.
As one commentator explained:
"Public injury" does not mean that the consumer must actually suffer
damage, or that it must be shown that goods purchased are unequal to the
value expended. Rather, "public injury" results if the advertisement has a
tendency to induce action (such as the purchase itself) detrimental to the
consumer that might not otherwise have been taken. If such action could
not have been induced by the claim (even though false), there is no "public
injury." This requirement comports with the expressed provision of Section
15 of the FTC Act, as amended, that the advertisement must be misleading
in a material respect to be actionable.
Nonetheless, the Commission has been ready to find that almost any falsehood
18 Millstein, supra note 6, at 478. Since the publication of Millstein's article, there has
been a slight and gradual acceptance of consumer surveys by the FTC. See, e.g., note 123
infra; Brandt & Preston, The Federal Trade Commission's Use of Evidence to Determine
Deception, 41 J. MiTuG. 54 (1977); Hunt, What About Marketing Research and the
Law at the Federal Trade Commission, 1975 Combined Proceedings of American Marketing
Association 85 (1975).
19 Bernacchi, Advertising and Its Discretionary Control by the FTC: A Need for Empirically
Based Criteria, 52 J. URB. L. 223, 249 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bernacchi].
20 Allen B. Wrisley Co. v. FTC, 113 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1940).
21 208 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1954), rev'd. on other grounds, 348 U.S. 940 (1955).
22 Bernacchi, supra note 19 at 249.
23 American Tobacco Co. v. FTC, 47 F.T.C. 1393, 1403 (1951).
24 80 HARV. L. REv. 1005 (1967), supra note 6, at 1056 n. 105.
25 Millstein, supra note 6, at 485 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
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might affect purchasing decisions on the basis that advertisements are designed
for that very purpose.2" A number of commentators have taken exception to
this approach; they have maintained that the FTC should be required to show
that the falsehood could affect the actions of buyers."
So far it has been seen that objective approaches to detecting and proving
deceptive advertising have generally been eschewed by the FTC. As mentioned
above,2" this subjective approach taken by the Commission has been criticized
by numerous and diverse commentators. One of these29 has set forth a proposal
that a regularized procedure be established by FTC rule that encourages or
requires the use of "nonpartisan" surveys to establish consumer understanding
and to prove or disprove consumer deception. By including sufficient numbers
in the universe of those questioned, a valid subsample can be drawn to reflect
the relevant group. One of the factors" to be considered in determining the
relevant group is the appropriate intelligence level. Gellhorn suggests that
"deception of a sufficient number of consumers will satisfy the 'public interest' or
'materiality' requirements."'" As is discussed within,2 this article proposes that
the measuring instrument should incorporate "materiality" through a "salience
score" that would measure the importance of an advertising claim in affecting
a purchase decision. The appropriate use of nonpartisan surveys can provide
an objective means of addressing the four substantive questions" involved in all
deceptive advertising cases.
III. Corrective Advertising
A. Need for Corrective Advertising
Once the FTC has proven that there has been deceptive advertising, it
traditionally employs the cease and desist order as its primary remedy. 4 There
26 80 HARv. L. REV. 1005 (1967), supra note 6, at 1056, n. 108.
27 See, e.g., id.; Milistein, supra note 6, at 487; Armstrong, Kendall & Russ, Applica-
tions of Consumer Inform'ation Processing Research to Public Policy Issues, 2 Com. RESEARCH
232 (1975).
28 See note 2 supra.
29 Gellhorn, supra note 2, at 567-72.
30 Gellhorn suggests the sample might be limited to those (1) who were reached by the
advertisement, (2) to whom it was directed, (3) who might be reached by the ad, (4) who
the advertisement reached who also purchased the product, or (5) most likely to be deceived
as a result of background, training, or experience who are also included in the group who
might be reached. Id. at 570.
31 Id. at 571.
32 See text accompanying notes 157-70 infra.
33 See text accompanying note 5 supra.
34 See, e.g., Note, Corrective Advertising and the FTC: No, Virginia, Wonder Bread
Doesn't Build Strong Bodies Twelv.e Ways, 70 MicH. L. REV. 374 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Note-Mich. L. Rev.]. The -original grant of authority to the FTC did not specifically man-
date the agency to address deceptive advertising but was quite general: "[u]nfair methods of
competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful." Act of September 26, 1914, ch. 311
§ 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914). The FTC nevertheless assumed the role of regulating advertising
but encountered a substantial restriction upon its ability to do so when the Supreme Court
held that the FTC could prohibit deceptive advertising only if it injured competition without
regard to any demonstrated harm to consumers. Fed. Trade Comm. Co. v. Raladam, 283
U.S. 643 (1931). In 1938 Congress enacted the Wheeler-Lea Act which amended section 5
of the FTC Act to read: "[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." Act of March 21,
1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. II1 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1934)). This amendment
was designed to authorize the FTC to protect the consumer who may be injured by an unfair
trade practice. H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1938).
[Vol. 54: 73]
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are, however, at least two fundamental inadequacies of this remedy that have
brought about the FTC's use of corrective advertising. The first is the so-called
"delay profits":
In a classic example of administrative ineptitude, the Commission required
sixteen years to compel the respondent in Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC to
drop the misleading reference to the liver in "Carter's Little Liver Pills."
Such extreme cases may be rare, but delays of from three to five years
between the issuance of a complaint and final issuance of a cease and
desist order are common. The deceptive advertiser thus continues his
campaign with impunity, taking advantage of every dilatory procedural
tactic, and reaping additional profits from his wrong. By the time the
order has become final, the particular campaign has probably been squeezed
dry, if not already discarded in favor of a fresh one. Hence the guilty party
loses nothing but attorneys' fees-and may gain far more.
3
1
This phenomenon completely deprives cease and desist orders of any deterrent
effect.
Second, the traditional remedies do nothing to eliminate the false impres-
sion created by the deceptive advertising that persists after the ad has ceased. 6
The FTC's own standard for imposing corrective advertising explains the
nature of this inadequacy:
If a deceptive advertisement has played a substantial role in creating or
reinforcing in the public's mind a false and material belief which lives on
after the false advertising ceases, there is clear and continuing injury to
competition and to the consuming public as consumers continue to make
purchasing decisions based on the false belief. Since this injury cannot be
averted by merely requiring respondent to cease disseminating the advertise-
ment, we may appropriately order respondent to take affirmative action
designed to terminate the otherwise continuing ill effects of the advertise-
ment.1
7
Several solutions-other than corrective advertising-to the delay profit
problem have been advanced, including private lawsuits for damages or in-
junctions, counter-advertising to expose the deception, and boycotts.3 " To date
these have generally proved ineffective. Another type of solution would be to
broaden the injunctive power of the FTC. By so doing, the Commission could
shorten the time period during which the violator enjoyed the benefits of the
delay profit. This, however, would solve only some of the current problems of
delay for it would address only the most blatant forms of deception while entail-
ing some delay so that consumers and competitors would still lack adequate
protection
39
35 Note, Corrective Advertising Orders of the Federal Trade Commission, 85 Harv. L. Rev.
477, 482-83 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Note-HARv. L. REv.].
36 Thain, Corrective Advertising: Theory and Cases, 19 N.Y.L.F. 1, 17 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as Thain].
37 See 562 F.2d at 762.
38 For a discussion of these alternative solutions see Note-HARev. L. REv., sup-ra note 35,
at 484-87.
39 Id. at 486, 487.
[October 1978]
DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING
None of the traditional remedies would seem to have any effect in solving
the problem of the persisting misconceptions instilled by deceptive advertising
campaigns. The FTC, therefore, looked to new solutions, and since 1970, has
filed a series of complaints proposing corrective advertising orders and accepted
a number of consent orders incorporating corrective messages.
Corrective advertising, most simply stated, is advertising designed to inform
consumers that previous advertising by the company was deceptive.4" As such
it is a variant, or extension, of affirmative disclosure,41 although there are a
number of significant differences between the two. First, affirmative disclosure
is required only where the failure to reveal certain facts in current advertisements
may mislead the consumers, whereas corrective advertising is intended to counter-
act abuses arising from past advertisements. Thus, corrective advertising may be
required even after the company has ceased running the deceptive ad. Second,
while affirmative disclosure does not make reference to past advertisements, cor-
rective ads typically do so in order to eradicate their residual effects. Finally,
affirmative disclosure orders have no time limit in that the order bars the
company from publishing any ad that fails to clearly disclose the required in-
formation while at the same time the FTC has determined that silence per se
is deceptive. On the other hand, corrective advertising orders usually specify a
time period during which no ad can be run without the FTC approved cor-
rective message. 2
B. Development of Corrective Advertising
The first time that the Federal Trade Commission considered the remedy of
the corrective advertising order was in Campbell Soup Company.4 In that case,
a group of law students (Students Opposing Unfair Practices or "SOUP")
40 See Note-MicH. L. REV., supra note 34, at 374. Professor Thain writes:
Corrective advertising orders postulate that, in certain circumstances, an ad-
vertising campaign will affect consumer behavior beyond the life of the campaign
itself. Thus, the traditional Commission cease and desist orders will be ineffective in
completely eliminating the deception. A more forceful order, one which brings to
light or corrects the prior deception is necessary. For example, a misleading claim for
a product may create an impression in the consumer's mind about that product.
Thereafter, successive advertisements, even if they do not contain the misleading
claims, may trigger a conscious or subconscious remembrance of the de-[sic] at the
time of repurchase. Indeed, the actual deceptive claim need not be remembered;
as long as the favorable impression of the product based upon the deceptive claim
is retained and acted upon, the initial deception continues to influence the con-
sumer's behavior. A primary purpose, therefore, of corrective advertising orders
is to alert the consumer that he has been operating on erroneous information so that
his future practices are not influenced by the deceptive advertisements.
Thain, supra note 36, at 17-18.
41 562 F.2d at 759 (discussed at text accompanying note 113 infra); Note, Corrective
Advertising-The New Response to Consumer Deception, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 415, 419 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Note--CoLUI. L. REV.]; Note-MicH. L. REv., supra note 34, at 381.
Affirmative disclosure is based on the concern that insufficient information has
been supplied in the advertising. The company is, therefore, required to disclose
in its advertising some of the deficiencies or limitations of its product or service so
that the consumer may be aware of the negative as well as the positive attributes.
Such disclosure may be necessary where safety hazards are involved, or where per-
formance limitations exist that may not be apparent to the consumer.
Legal Developments in Marketing, 36 J. MICTING. 68 (Oct. 1972).
42 Note--COLUbi. L. REV., supra note 41, at 419.
43 Campbell Soup Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (COH) 19,261.
[Vol. 54:73]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
attempted to intervene after the FTC had issued a cease and desist order against
Campbell Soup Company from engaging in the deceptive advertising practice
of placing marbles in their soup in order to give a richer appearance to the soup.
The intervenors asked that the Commission issue an order
requiring the respondent who has falsely advertised to affirmatively state
that it has used a specific method of advertising in the past which the Com-
mission charges as [sic] or has been found misleading. . . . The provision
would also stipulate that the disclosure must be included in current ad-
vertising for a period of time equal to the time in which the deceptive ad-
vertisements were publicized and be conspicuously displayed.
44
The majority of the Commission denied SOUP's request and accepted the pro-
posed consent order, which did not contain a corrective advertising order.45
In the seventeen major4" corrective advertising cases brought since Campbell
Soup, the terms of the corrective advertising sought by the FTC have varied
considerably with respect to two aspects: the required disclosure and exposure.
The terms of the final order17 have frequently differed from those framed by the
complaint.48 Much of the variation has resulted from an attempt to tailor the
corrective ad to fit the particular needs of the individual case.49 Some of the
deviations, however, appear to reflect changing trends in the approach of the
staff at the FTC.
From these cases there appear to have been two different approaches taken
by the FTC in framing the disclosure terms of corrective advertisements. The
first approach parallels that proposed in the intervention petition of SOUP"'
and in its essentials continued until the complaint against Amstar.5 The pro-
posed corrective advertisement in the complaint against Standard Oil of Cali-
fornia52 illustrates this first approach.
In addition to prohibiting the alleged misrepresentation, the proposed
order in the complaint would require that any gasoline advertising by
Standard for the next year clearly and conspicuously disclose that the FTC
has found that the company's previous advertising for Chevron with F-310
44 Brief for Intervenor, Campbell Soup Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 19,261.
45 Campbell Soup Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. Rae. (CCH) 19,261 at
21,421.
46 Excluded from this count are cases of a predominately local nature (e.g., Hair Replace-
ment Centers of Flushing, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 640 (1975)), or those that are more affirmative
disclosure than corrective cases (e.g., C.E.B. Products, Inc., 85 F.T.C. 565 (1975)), or merely
public notification (e.g., STP Corp., [1978] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,390.
47 With one exception, all cases in which a final order containing corrective advertising
has presently been obtained ended in a negotiated consent order. A final order with cor-
rective advertising provisions has resulted from litigation in only one case: Warner-Lambert
v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1575 (1978). For a discus-
sion of this case see text accompanying notes 86-129 infra.
48 In two cases, the corrective advertisement was proposed by an intervenor-SOUP.
Campbell Soup Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,261; Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 19,773.
49 Thain, supra note 36, at 8.
50 Campbell Soup Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 19,261.
51 Amstar Corp. [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,696 at
21,742.
52 [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 20,789.
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contained false, misleading, and deceptive statements, representations and
demonstrations and the products in fact did not reduce air pollution....-53
What is common to all eight of these proposed orders is the requirement of a
statement to the effect that the FTC had found (or alleged) particular repre-
sentations and/or demonstrations deceptive coupled with a restatement of these
representations.
The Amstar54 and Warner-Lambert5 cases signaled a transition to a dif-
ferent approach. In the Amstar case, the FTC complaint called for a second
type of disclosure: "Contrary to previous advertising the products do not have the
alleged attributed qualities.""0  The complaint, however, did not entirely
abandon the original approach, for it retained as an alternative: "If record facts
show such disclosure is inadequate to protect the public or competitors, the Com-
mission may require Amstar to devote at least 251% of each advertisement for the
next year to a clear and conspicuous disclosure that the FTC has found that they
have been falsely advertised."5 7 The complaint issued against Warner-Lambert
followed the original pattern, but was modified on November 25, 1974 by the
administrative law judge to require the second type of disclosure.5" Following
these two cases, all of the complaints in the major cases sought the second type
of disclosure in the corrective advertisements, with the" single exception of
Wasem's," in which the FTC obtained a consent order that provided for dis-
closure that combined the elements of both types."0
The second respect in which the corrective advertising orders sought by the
FTC have varied is the amount of exposure required for the specified disclosure.
Exposure consists of two components-density and duration-and the orders
proposed by the FTC have differed as to both. There have been essentially three
different density formulas employed. The one most often utilized"1 calls for not
53 [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,352 at 21,485.
54 Amstar Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 19,696.
55 FTC v. Warner-Lambert, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1
19,838.
56 Amstar Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 19,696 at
21,742.
57 Id.
58 Warner-Lambert, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 20,776 at
20,636.
59 Wasem's Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP. (CCHI) 1 20,536.
60 The required disclosure was:
This advertisement is run pursuant to an order of the Federal Trade Com-
mission. I have previously been advertising Wasem's Super B Vitamins and have
made various claims which are erroneous or misleading. Contrary to what I have
told you previously Super B will not make you feel better nor make you better to
live with nor work better on the job. There is no need for most people to supple-
ment their diet with vitamins or minerals. Excess dosages over the recommended
daily adult requirements of most vitamins will be flushed through the body and be
of no benefit whatsoever. Contrary to my previous ads, neither the Food and Drug
Administration nor the Federal Trade Commission nor anyone else has recommended
Super B or approved our prior claims ....
Id. at 20,468.
61 Wasem's Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ff 20,536 at 20,468.
Chemway Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,400 at 21,521;
Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
19,477 at 21,556; ITT Continental Baking Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 19,539 at 21,614; American Home Products Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (OCH) 19,673 at 21,721; Warner-Lambert, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder]
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less than 25 percent of print space and not less than 25 percent of broadcast time
to be devoted to the corrective message for the time period specified in the order.
The second most frequently12 employed density provision requires the clear and
conspicuous disclosure of the corrective message in all advertisements for the
time period specified in the order. This was the density sought by SOUP in the
first corrective advertising case. Finally, in some cases, 3 the FTC has sought a
density that is really a variant of the first: 25 percent of advertising ex-
penditures for each medium in each market in the same time periods as other
advertising.
In another component of exposure, the duration, the FTC64 has, with few
exceptions, called for all advertising to cease and desist for one year unless the
required disclosure at the prescribed density was included. The first deviation
from this occurred in the "analgesic cases"6 2 in which the FTC called for two
years, the same duration that the administrative law judge called for in his
modification of the order in Warner-Lambert.6 The second deviation arose in
the Sugar Information case" where the complaint called for at least one cor-
rective advertisement to be run in each magazine in which the questioned ad-
vertising had previously appeared.
The FTC's success in obtaining final orders incorporating their proposed
corrective advertising has been somewhat less than complete. In fact, the FTC
failed to obtain a corrective advertising order in the first five cases brought and
could only secure such relief in two 8 of its first eight cases. Since then, pre-
sumably by virtue of better case selection, the FTC has enjoyed far greater suc-
cess, managing to obtain an order for a corrective ad of some sort in all but one
case 9 it has brought.
The FTC's failures to obtain the proposed corrective advertising order
have occurred in one of two ways. In some instances, the administrative law
judge (or the commissioners) deciding the case refused to incorporate corrective
TRADE REG. REP (CCH) 19,838 at 21,859; Sun Oil Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,856 at 21,872; Shangri-La Ind., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG REP. (CCH) f 20,080 at 22,051.
62 Campbell Soup Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCII) ff 19,261
at 21,423; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REo. REP. (CCH)
T 19,373 at 21,500; Standard Oil of California, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) I 19,352 at 21,485; Sterling Drug, Inc., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) IT 19,925 at 21,937.
63 Amstar Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REQ. REP. (CCH) 1 19,696 at
21,742; American Home Products Corp., Sterling Drug, Inc., and Bristol-Myers Co., [1970-
1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) I 19,962 at 21,984.
64 In two cases corrective advertising was sought not by the FTC but by an intervenor.
In Campbell Soup Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) IT 19,261, SOUP,
the intervenor, proposed that corrective advertising be run for the same period of time that
the challenged ads had run.
65 American Home Products Corp., Sterling Drug, Inc., and Bristol-Meyers Co., [1970-
1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ('CCH) I 19,962 at 21,984.
66 Warner-Lambert Co., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,776
at 20,636.
67 Sugar Information, Inc., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCIH) 19,857
at 21,872.
68 Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
N 20,051 at 22,028; ITT Continental Baking Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) I 19,780 at 21,817 (final consent order to cease and desist concerning Profile).
69 Sun Oil Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REQ. Rap. (CCH) f 20,704 at 20,579.
At present no final order has been entered in the "analgesic cases."
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advertising into the final order. These decisions have been predicated upon two
different bases. The first-failure of proof of the alleged deceptive advertising-
was employed in only one case."0 In the remaining cases decided adversely by
either an administrative law judge7' or the FTC,"2 the second basis was used;
it was found that although deceptive advertising had been proved, the circum-
stances did not require the issuance of an order for corrective advertising. The
other way in which the FTC staff has failed to win a corrective advertising order
has arisen by the FTC's entering into consent orders not containing such a
term. This occurred in two cases.73
In the cases in which the FTC did succeed in obtaining a final order
providing for corrective advertising, all but one74 of them involved a consent
decree. In some instances, however, the consent decrees reflected a modification
of the proposed corrective ad. Of the seven cases resulting in a consent order,
three"5 of them involved a modification of the terms of disclosure while one76
changed the density of the exposure. All of the modifications resulted in milder
forms of corrective advertisements. For example, in the Ocean Spray77 case, the
FTC had sought an order requiring the company to disclose that the FTC has
alleged that the company had falsely described its cranberry beverage as a juice
and had falsely described the beverage's nutritional content.7' The final consent
order required only that the company's advertising contain the following
provision:
If you're wondering what some of our earlier advertising meant when
we said Ocean Spray Cranberry Juice Cocktail has more food energy than
orange juice or tomato juice, let us make it clear: we didn't mean vitamins
and minerals. Food energy means calories. Nothing more.
Food energy is important at breakfast since many of us may not get
enough calories, or food energy, to get off to a good start. Ocean Spray
70 Coca-Cola Co., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) U 20,470 at
20,391.
71 Sun Oil Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,704 at
20,579.
72 Campbell Soup Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) U 19,261
at 21,424; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
U 20,112 at 22,086; Standard Oil of California, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 20,789 at 20,647, 20,658; ITT Continental Baking Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) U 20,464 at 20,382-83 (final order to dismiss concerning Wonder and
Hostess).
73 Chemway Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) U 19,709 at
21,751; American Home Products, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
20,129 at 22,120.
74 562 F.2d 749.
75 Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
19,981 at 21,993; ITT Continental Baking Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 19,681 at 21,728; Sterling Drug, Inc., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. U 20,655 at 20,539.
76 ITT Continental Baking Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
19,681 at 21,728. The proposed order would require that at least 25 percent of each ad-
vertisement for the following year contain the corrective message while the consent order
required that for one year after final order at least 25 percent of expenditures (excluding
production costs) for Profile advertising for each media in each market be devoted to FTC
approved ads.
77 Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
U 19,477.
78 Id. at 21,556.
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Cranberry Juice Cocktail helps because it contains more food energy than
most other breakfast drinks.
And Ocean Spray Cranberry Juice Cocktail gives you and your family
Vitamin C plus a great wake-up taste. It's . .. the other breakfast drink.
7 9
Finally, in Warner-Lambert," the FTC obtained a court order that
modified the terms of disclosure, density, and duration of the corrective adver-
tisement as proposed by the FTC. In the most recent case, American Home
Products,8 there has not yet been a final order.
C. Legality of Corrective Advertising
As has been seen, the FTC has sought corrective advertising in some seven-
teen cases and obtained orders in ten cases. Yet, until very recently, the courts
had not considered the question of the FTC's authority to order corrective
advertising. The Commission had already asserted on several occasions that it
has the authority to impose corrective advertising" and the commentators gen-
erally have been in agreement.83 The FTC's authority to utilize corrective ad-
vertising was upheld in Warner-Lambert84 decided by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia. 5 Due to the significance of the case and the
importance of corrective advertising to the objective approach advocated in
thrs article, the circuit court's opinion will receive close attention.
On June 27, 1972 the FTC issued a complaint 6 against Warner-Lambert
charging that it had violated section 5 (a) (1) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act817 by misrepresenting the efficacy of Listerine against the common cold.
Ever since Listerine's introduction to the market in 1879 it had been represented
as being beneficial in certain aspects for colds, cold symptoms, and sore throats.
Following the complaint, hearings were held before an administrative law judge
who on November 25, 1974 issued an initial decision sustaining the allegations
of the complaint. Warner-Lambert appealed to the Commission. On December
9, 1975 the Commission issued its decision 8 essentially affirming the administra-
tive law judge and ordering Warner-Lambert to:
(1) cease and desist from representing that Listerine will cure colds or
sore throats, prevent colds or sore throats, or that users of Listerine will have
fewer colds than non-users;
79 Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
1 19,981 at 21,993.
80 562 F.2d 749.
81 American Home Products Corp., Sterling Drug, Inc., and Bristol-Meyers Co., [1970-1973
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 20,263.
82 Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90
HARV. L. REV. 661, 694 (1977).
83 Id. at 696; Thain, supra note 36, at 20; Note-COLUM. L. REV., supra note 41, at 424;
Note, The Federal Trade Commission and the Corrective Advertising Order, 6 U.S.F.L. REV.
367, 382 (1972).
84 562 F.2d 749.
85 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 98 S. Ct. 1575 (1978).
86 Warner-Lambert Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ff 20,045
at 22,026.
87 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970) (amended 1975).
88 Warner-Lambert Co., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,066
at 20,926, 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975).
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(2) cease and desist from representing that Listerine is a treatment for,
or will lessen the severity of, colds or sore throats; that it will have any
significant beneficial effect on the symptoms of sore throats or any bene-
ficial effect on symptoms of colds; or that the ability of Listerine to kill
germs is of medical significance in the treatment of colds or sore throats
or their symptoms;
(3) cease and desist from disseminating any advertisement for Listerine
unless it is clearly and conspicuously disclosed in each such advertisement, in
the exact language below, that: "Contrary to prior advertising, Listerine
will not help prevent colds or sore throats or lessen their severity." This
requirement extends only to the next ten million dollars of Listerine ad-
vertising.89
Warner-Lambert (the petitioner) sought review of this order, and on
August 2, 1977, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit handed down its decision90 in an opinion written by Judge Wright. On
April 3, 1978 the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.9 Warner-Lambert had
argued before the circuit court for a reversal of the order based upon three
grounds. The first was that the Commission's conclusion that Listerine is not
beneficial for colds or sore throats is unsupported by the evidence. The court
stated that the Commission's findings of fact must be sustained if they are sup-
ported by substantial evidence on the record viewed as a whole.92 After noting
that the hearings before the administrative law judge had covered over four
months and had produced an evidentiary record consisting of some 4,000 pages
and testimony from 46 witnesses,93 the court reviewed the evidence and con-
cluded that not only had full consideration been given to studies submitted by
Warner-Lambert, but also the findings of the administrative law judge were sup-
ported by substantial evidence.9 4 In its review of the evidence, the court dis-
cussed at greater length the petitioner's argument that the FTC's findings differed
from those of the Food and Drug Administration. The FDA study resulted
from an expert panel appointed in 1972 to study all over-the-counter cough,
cold, allergy, bronchodilator, and anti-asthmatic products. The panel's report
was published9 5 after the FTC issued its order against Listerine. The report had
89 562 F.2d at 753. The full text of the order may be found at Warner-Lambert Co.
v. FTC, 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1513-15 (1975).
90 562 F.2d 749. Amicus curiae briefs were filed on behalf of The Association of National
Advertisers, Inc. and The American Advertising Federation, both supporting Warner-Lambert's
petition for reversal of the FTC's order.
91 See note 85 supra.
92 562 F.2d at 753 (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951)).
93 562 F.2d at 752.
94 The court found the evidence to support the following findings made by the Com-
mission: (a) that the ingredients of Listerine are not present in sufficient quantities to have
any therapeutic effect; (b) that in the process of gargling it is impossible for Listerine to reach
the critical areas of the body in medically significant concentration; (c) that even if significant
quantities of the active ingredients of Listerine were to reach the critical sites where cold viruses
enter and infect the body, they could not interfere with the activities of the virus because they
could not penetrate the tissue cells; (d) that the results of a clinical study conducted by Warner-
Lambert should be discounted because of the study's design and execution rendered its
results unreliable; (e) that the ability of Listerine to kill germs by the millions on contact is
of no medical significance in the treatment of colds or sore throats because colds are caused
by viruses; and (f) that Listerine has no significant beneficial effect on the symptoms of sore
throat. Id. at 753-54.
95 41 Fed. Reg. 38312 (1976).
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not been adopted by the Commissioner of the FDA, and the FTC refused to
reopen its proceedings to consider the report. The report placed each ingredient
of Listerine in Category III, which is defined as "the available data are in-
sufficient to classify such condition under either [Category I, generally recognized
as safe and effective] or [Category II, not generally recognized as safe and ef-
fective] and for which further testing is therefore required."
9
The court reasoned that since the FDA study was not based upon any data
not considered by the FTC, nor did the study consider the extensive record
developed in the FTC hearings, the conclusion reached by the FDA that there
was insufficient evidence to classify Listerine as effective or ineffective was not
necessarily inconsistent with the FTC's conclusion that Warner-Lambert's ad-
vertising was deceptive. The court
97 concluded that the FTC did not err in re-
fusing to reopen its proceedings and that the limited findings of the FDA did not
establish that the FTC's findings were wrong.
The second basis of the petitioner's argument was that even if the adver-
tising claims made in the past were false, the portion of the FTC's order re-
quiring corrective advertising exceeded the Commission's statutory power.
9"
The court first examined the legislative grant of authority to the FTC and found
that it, if read literally, authorized the Commission to issue cease and desist orders
against violators and did not expressly mention any other remedies. Relying on
Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States,
99 the court held that the
modern view was that the Commission had the power to shape remedies beyond
the simple cease and desist order. It then turned its attention to the crucial issue
of whether a corrective advertising order is within the range of permissible
remedies. The various briefs submitted to the court advanced three arguments
for the proposition that the order for corrective advertising was not within the
FTC's power: (1) the legislative history, (2) conflicts with the first amendment,
and (3) absence of judicial approval.
Turning first to the legislative history of the 1914 Federal Trade Commis-
96 21 CFR § 330.10(a)(5) (iii)(1976).
97 The dissenting judge agreed with the majority that there was sufficient 
evidence in the
record to support an order requiring Warner-Lambert to cease and desist 
from advertising
Listerine as a remedy for colds and sore throats. 562 F.2d at 764 (Robb, 
J., dissenting).
98 Judge Robb dissented to this part of the court's opinion. Id.
99 371 U.S. 296 (1963). The dissent argued that this case taken in 
the context of its
facts does not support the court's conclusion:
In the Pan American case the court considered the power of the Civil Aeronautics
Board under section 411 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. 
§ 1381,
to order an air carrier to cease and desist from "unfair . . . . practices 
or unfair
methods of competition." The court held that the Board's jurisdiction 
over unfair
pr-4ctices and unfair methods of competition, together with its power 
under the Act
to regulate air carriers, and to deal with consolidations, mergers, 
interlocking rela-
iions, pooling arrangements, etc., 49 U.S.C. §§ 1378, 1379, and its 
authority to enforce
the Clayton Act as it is applicable to air carriers, 15 U.S.C. § 
21, empower the
Board to order divestiture when a combination between carriers violates 
the antitrust
laws and hinders the Board's restructuring of routes. Considered 
in the light of the
specific and extensive statutory underpinning upon which the 
court based this
decision it is a far cry from a holding that the power to order 
divestiture was derived
only from the authority to issue cease and desist orders, as the majority 
opinion sug-
gests. Certainly it does not follow from this case that the power 
of the Federal Trade
Commission to order corrective advertising can be derived 
from its authority to issue
cease and desist orders, standing alone.
562 F.2d at 766-767 (Robb, J., dissenting).
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sion Act.. and the Wheeler-Lea amendments to it in 1938,10 the court sum-
marily concluded that the fact that at these two times Congress did not choose
to authorize such remedies as criminal penalties, treble damages, or civil penalties
was not dispositive of the corrective advertising question. More attention was
given to the 1975 amendments to the Acte0 2 which authorized the Commission
to bring suit in a U.S. District Court to redress injury to consumers resulting
from a deceptive act or practice. One of the types of relief authorized to be
granted is public notification respecting the deceptive act or practice. The peti-
tioners argued that the congressional grant of this power to order public notifica-
tion to a court establishes that the Commission does not have that power. The
court rejected this argument on several grounds. First, it noted that public
notification was broader than corrective advertising." 3 Second, it distinguished
the public notification contemplated by the amendment from corrective ad-
vertising upon the basis that the former is directed at past consumers while the
latter is designed to protect future consumers. Finally, the court observed that
this contention of the petitioner conflicted with the Congressional intent ex-
pressed in the amendment: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect
any authority of the Commission under any other provision of law."'0 4 These
three propositions led the court to conclude that "this legislative history cannot
be said to remove corrective advertising from the class of permissible remedies."'0 5
100 Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
101 Ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
102 The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) in relevant
part states:
If any person, partnership, or corporation engages in any unfair or deceptive act or
practice (within the meaning of section 45 (a) of this title) with respect to which the
Commission has issued a final cease and desist order which is applicable to such
person, partnership, or corporation, then the Commission may commence a civil
action against such person, partnership, or corporation in a United States district
court or any court of competent jurisdiction of a state. If the Commission satisfies
the court that the act or practice to which the cease and desist order relates is one
which a reasonable man would have known under the circumstances was 'dishonest or
fraudulent, the court may grant relief under subsection (b) of this section.
(b) The court in an action under subsection (a) of this section shall have jurisdic-
tion to grant such relief as the court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers or
other persons, partnerships, and corporations resulting from the rule violation or un-
fair or deceptive act or practice, as the case may be. Such relief may include, but
shall not be limited to, rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund of money
or return of property, the payment of damages, and public notification respecting the
rule violation or the unfair or deceptive act or practice, as the case may be; except
that nothing in this subsection is intended to authorize the imposition of any exemplary
or punitive damages.
103 The implication of this statement would appear to be that since public notification is
more inclusive than corrective advertising, then those forms of public notification not included
in' corrective advertising would represent an extension of the arguably already existent powers
of the FTC. The dissent attacks this attempt by the majority to distinguish public notification
and corrective advertising by taking one of the examples of public notification given by the
majority ("requiring the defendant to run special advertisements reporting the FTC finding)
and noting that according to the FTC the example is also corrective advertising. 562 F.2d at
766 n.2 (Robb, J., dissenting). Since corrective advertising is a subset of public notification this
is not surprsng. The majority provides other examples of public notification (advertisements
advising consumers of the availability of a refund or the posting of notices in the defendant's
place of business) that are not corrective advertisements. Id. at 757 n. 36.
104 15 U.S.C. § 57b(e) (1970). The dissent argued that this language simply preserved
the existing power of the FTC and that question was not answered by either the amendment
or the Committee's report. 562 F.2d at 766 (Robb, J., dissenting).
105 562 F.2d at 758.
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The court next addressed the first amendment issue by first noting that this
amendment requires that the corrective advertising order be no more restrictive
than necessary.. 6 and then deferred discussion of this question until later in the
opinion.0 The court then turned to the more fundamental first amendment
issue, namely, the recent Supreme Court decision. 8 extending first amendment
protection to commercial advertising rendered corrective advertising unconstitu-
tional. The court quickly disposed of this assertion by finding that the Spreme
Court expressly noted that the first amendment does not prevent governmental
regulation of false and misleading advertisement." 9 The court found further
support for this position:
In a footnote the Court went on to delineate several differences between
commercial speech and other forms which may suggest "that a different
degree of protection is necessary." For example, the Court said, they
"may make it appropriate to require that a commercial message appear in
such a form, or include such additional information, warnings, and dis-
claimers as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive." 10
The court ruled that this prescient statement foresaw the issue of corrective
advertising and therefore was dispositive of the first amendment issue."'
The court devoted considerably more time to the question whether there
was any previous judicial authority for corrective advertising. The immediate
necessity for the court to have done so was presented by the petitioner's argument
that the late emergence of corrective advertising was itself evidence that it is
beyond the Commission's authority. The court rejected this argument on two
counts. First, the court stated that an agency's failure to assert a power over a
period of years is not proof that the agency lacks such a power."' Second, the
court held that the remedy was not "such an innovation. The label may be newly
coined, but the concept is well established. It is simply that under certain cir-
106 The court cited United States v. Nat'l Society of Professional Engineers, 555 F.2d 978,
984 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 618-20 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
107 The court addressed the issue when it examined the appropriateness of the remedy.
562 F.2d at 758. See text accompanying notes 120-28 infra.
108 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976). The court of appeals also cited Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975);
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
109 The court quoted the following statement from Virginia State Board of Pharmacy:
"[The First Amendment], as we construe it today, does not prohibit the state from insuring
that the stream of commercial information flow[s] cleanly as well as freely." 425 U.S. at 772.
110 562 F.2d at 758 (quoting Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n. 24).
111 The dissenting opinion did not discuss the First Amendment issue at all.
112 The court cited United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 647-48 (1950);
National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 693-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). It would seem that this should have sufficied to dispose of the
lack of prior use argument, but the court proceeded to attempt to find positive judicial recog-
nition of corrective advertising. It may be that the court engaged in this pursuit because
earlier in its opinion it had relied upon the statement of legislative intent: "Nothing in this
section shall be construed to affect any authority of the Commission under any provision of
law." See note 104 supra. This assertion probably sent the court scurrying for some "other
provision of law." Arguably, it could have viewed the question of the Commission's authority
as one of first impression and ruled that the proper interpretation of the various legislative
grants was that corrective advertising was within the realm of appropriate remedies.
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cumstances an advertiser may be required to make affirmative disclosure of un-
favorable facts.""'
The court then sought to find judicial precedent for corrective advertising
in the several FTC orders for affirmative disclosure that were approved on ap-
peal over objections that they exceeded the Commission's statutory authority." 4
Two cases in particular were discussed and merit mention because they formed
the principal bridge for the analogy drawn by the court between affirmative
disclosure and corrective advertising as well as representing the focal point in
the difference in opinion between the majority and the dissent.
The first case". involved the Royal Baking Powder Company which for 60
years had stressed in its advertising that its product was superior because it was
made with cream of tartar rather than phosphate. Rising costs forced the
company to switch to phosphate; at the same time, it carefully removed all
mention of cream of tartar from its labels and advertisements, but kept the same
format of its labels. In addition, the new advertisements no longer mentioned
phosphate nor the change in the product. The Second Circuit upheld the Com-
mission's order requiring the company to make affirmative disclosure."xG
In the second case,"' the Waltham Watch Company of Massachusetts,
which had become well known for its fine clocks since 1849, after ceasing the
manufacture of clocks transferred its trademarks, good will, and the trade-name
"Waltham" to a successor corporation. This corporation began importing clocks
from Europe for resale in the United States, and advertising them as "products
of Waltham Company since 1850," "a famous 150-year-old company." The
FTC's order that the company disclose that the clocks were not made by the old
Waltham Company and that they were imported was upheld by the Seventh
Circuit." '
The court then used these two cases as precedent for the existence of authority
in the FTC to order corrective advertising:
It appears to us that the orders in Royal and Waltham were the same
113 562 F.2d at 759.
114 The court cited Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960); Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18 (5th
Cir. 1960); Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th "Cir. 1960); J. B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d
884 (6th Cir. 1967). In addition, it dealt with Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818 (1950) in the following fashion:
In Alberty v. FTC this court set aside an order similar to the one upheld in 1. B.
Williams Co. v. FTC. The precise holding of Alberty is disputed. Several courts
have stated that it held only that the Commission must make an express finding that
failure to make disclosure is misleading before it can require such disclosure. Fel v.
FTC; Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC; Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC.
To the extent that Alberty may have held that the Commission lacked power to
order corrective advertising, it has never been followed. The characterization of the
required disclosure as "additional, interesting, and perhaps useful, information" may
or may not have been accurate in Alberty, but it grossly understates the case at hand.
The disclosure that Listerine does not relieve colds is essential information to correct
a widely held, mistaken belief which was cultivated by petitioner's past advertising.
562 F.2d at 759 n. 52 (citations omitted).
115 Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281 F. 744 (2d Cir. 1922).
116 281 F. at 753.
117 Waltham Watch Co. v. FTC, 318 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944
(1963), reh. denied, 375 U.S. 998 (1964).
118 Id. at 32.
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kind of remedy the Commission has ordered here. Like Royal and Waltham,
Listerine has built up over a period of many years a widespread reputation.
When it was ascertained that the reputation no longer applied to the
product, it was necessary to take action to correct it. Here, as in Royal and
Waltham, it is the accumulated impact of past advertising that necessitates
disclosure in future advertising. To allow consumers to continue to buy
the product on the strength of the impression built up by prior advertising
-an impression which is now known to be false-would be unfair and
deceptive."19
The last issue addressed by the court was the appropriateness of the remedy
actually applied to Warner-Lambert. After modifying the FTC's order to delete
the phrase "Contrary to prior advertising," the court alluded to the circumscribed
role allowed the reviewing court by the Supreme Court:
The Commission is the expert body to determine what remedy is necessary
to eliminate the unfair or deceptive trade practices which have been dis-
closed. It has wide latitude for judgment, and the courts will not interfere
except where the remedy selected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful
practices found to exist.""
The court then examined the standard utilized by the Commission"' and
summarized it as dictating two factual inquiries: "(1) did Listerine's advertise-
ments play a substantial role in creating or reinforcing in the public's mind a false
belief about the product? and (2) would this belief linger on after the false ad-
vertising ceases?""' The court found that there had been substantial evidence in
119 562 F.2d at 761 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). The court added in a
footnote:
In Royal and Waltham the advertising claims that had given rise to the products'
reputations were concededly true when made, but because the products themselves
had changed that reputation was no longer deserved .... But the result here is the
same as in the earlier cases-like Royal baking powder or Waltham watches, Listerine
continues to enjoy a reputation it does not deserve, and consumers therefore would
be deceived if they were to make purchases in reliance upon that reputation.
Id. at 761 n. 58.
The dissent disagreed with this conclusion:
In those cases advertisements falsely represented that the products offered for sale
were the same as the products, well-known to the public, which had been offered in
the past. The Commission's orders simply required these false representations to be
corrected in future advertisements using the same or similar format or copy. In the
present case, however, when Warner-Lambert has ceased and desisted from advertising
Listerine as a remedy for colds and sore throats there will be nothing to correct in
the text of the Listerine advertisements. Any "corrective statement" will relate solely
to past advertising.
Id. at 768 (Robb, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 762 (quoting from Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946)).
121 See text accompanying note 37 supra. The dissent objected to this standard:
The theory of the majority is that whenever "advertisements play a substantial
role in creating or reinforcing in the public's mind a false belief about [a] product"
and "this belief [may] linger on after the false advertising ceases," corrective ad-
vertising may be ordered. As the majority apparently concedes, this test would apply
to almost any advertisement which is the subject of a cease and desist order. I cannot
accept this concept. I reject the proposition that the after-effects of advertising
which has been discontinued pursuant to a cease and desist order can thus expand
the Commission's statutory power to prevent future illegal practices .. .In my opinion
such an expansion must be made by the Congress, not by this court.
562 F.2d at 68 (Robb, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 762.
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support of the need for corrective advertising in the "Product Q'" survey data
and the expert testimony interpreting them. 3
With the exception of the "confessional preamble," the court also upheld
the specific disclosure required: "Contrary to prior advertising, Listerine will
not help prevent colds or sore throats or lessen their severity."' 24 The court
ordered the deletion of the phase "Contrary to prior advertising" because it felt
that it was not needed 25 to call attention to the corrective message that was to
follow and this case was not egregious enough to warrant its use for humiliating
the advertiser. 20
Finally, the court affirmed 2 7 the duration of the required disclosure which
would continue until a sum had been expended on Listerine advertising equal to
the average annual advertising budget for the period of April 1962 to March
1972.2 This would last about one year if Warner-Lambert continues to ad-
vertise as it normally does. The court agreed with the Commission that a dura-
tion of a fixed time would not be as effective, since Warner-Lambert- could
evade the order by not advertising at all.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the order as modified. 9
IV. An Objective Approach
The FTC has taken a subjective approach to the detection and correction
123 According to the court:
The Commission used the results of a series of market surveys know as "Product Q"
reports on the "Mouthwash Market." The surveys were conducted by petitioner for
its own purposes from 1963 to 1971. According to petitioner's own advertising
agency, "Product Q is ideally suited to provide guidance in such vital areas as . . .
[h]ow successful are the current advertising campaigns of different brands on aware-
ness, recall, attitudes and sales?" The surveys showed that about 70% of the con-
sumers questioned recalled "effective for colds and sore throats" as a main theme
of Listerine advertising. During the summer, when no cold claims had been broad-
cast for about six months, the percentage fell to only 64%; i.e., the recall of cold
claims after six months of silence was very substantial. The surveys also showed that
about 60% of consumers questioned believed Listerine was "one of the best" mouth-
washes for the quality "effective against colds and sore throats." (citations omitted).
The Commission also relied on the testimony of two experts in the field of consumer
marketing surveys. Dr. Bass testified that cold efficacy belief levels would continue
at about 60% for two years after colds advertising ceased and would remain high
after five years. Dr. Rossi testified that cold efficacy beliefs would decline at no
greater a rate than 5% per year. (citations omitted).
Id. at 762-63 n. 65.
124 Id. at 763.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 764. In a footnote, the court stated: "We express no view on the question
whether an order intended to humiliate the wrongdoer would be so punitive as to be outside
the Commission's proper authority." Id. at 763, n. 69.
128 See FTC's order at note 89 supra.
129 The dissent took the court to task for not considering all the terms of the order:
Section III of the order forbids any advertisements for Listerine without the corrective
statement. Yet it is considered that Listerine is effective as a mouthwash and
breath freshener, and it appears that in recent years much of the greater part of
Warner-Lambert's advertising budget for Listerine has been spent in promoting
these uses of the preparation. Thus the Commission and the majority would forbid
the publication of truthful advertisements of Listerine's effectiveness unless coupled
with a disclaimer relating to uses advertised in the past. I cannot believe that the
statute contemplates such a remedy, which goes far beyond the prevention of "illegal
practices in the future."
562 F.2d at 768 (Robb, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 54:73]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
of deceptive advertising. Although the use of a more objective approach has
received wide advocacy, 3 ' there is not yet a widely accepted method for so
doing."' In order to help fill this gap, a study 12 was conducted that sought to
measure the presence of deceptive advertising, its residual effects, the effective-
ness of corrective advertising, and the "side effects" of such remedial measures.
More specifically, this study was designed to provide empirical insight into
five areas of inquiry:
1. Detecting the effects of a potentially deceptive advertisement.
2. The effectiveness of supplying "objective information"
13 ' in the eradica-
tion of the residual effects of a deceptive advertisement.
3. The comparative effectiveness of supplying "objective information" from
different sources (i.e., advertiser versus FTC) in the eradication of the
residual effects of a deceptive advertisement.
4. The effect of the passage of time upon deceptive and objective informa-
tion.
130 See note 2 supra. Others advocating such an approach include D. Aaker, Deceptive
Advertising, CONSUMERISM: SEARCH FOR THE CONSUMER INTEREST 137 (D. Aaker and G.
Day ed. 1974); Armstrong, Kendall, & Russ, Applications of Consumer Information Process-
ing Research to Public Policy Issues, 2 CoM. RESEARCH 232 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Armstrong]; Gardner, Deception in Advertising: A Conceptual Approach, 39 J.
MsTING. 40 (1975); Jacoby & Small, The FDA Approach to Defining Misleading Ad-
vertising, 39 J. MKTING. 65 (1975); Preston, A Comment on "Defining Misleading Ad-
vertising" and "Deception in Advertising," 40 J. MKTING. 54 (1976); Rosch, Marketing
Research and the Legal Requirements of Advertising, 39 J. MTING. 69 (1975); Bernacchi,
supra note 19.
131 Researchers who have tried to measure advertising deception used one of two principal
approaches. One approach involved displaying certain ads to subjects and asking them if the
ads were deceptive. For example, Haefner, The Perception of Deception in Television Ad-
vertising, An Exploratory Investigation (1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in University of
Minnesota library) discovered that the "ratings" of the subjects did not agree with the un-
official ratings of "deceptive and non-deceptive" made by the FTC attorney with respect to
the same ads. This approach is logically deficient because if a consumer judges an advertise-
ment to be deceptive he is not deceived himself. The second approach was based on measuring
brand attribute beliefs of consumers. The researchers (Kuehl & Dyer, Brand Belief
Measures in Deceptive and Corrective Advertising: An Experimental Assessment, Proceedings:
1976 Educator's Conference 373 (1976) and Applications of the Normative Belief Technique
for Measuring the Effectiveness of Deceptive and Corrective Advertisements, 4 ADVANCES IN
CONSUMER RESEARCH 204 (W. Perreault, Jr. ed. 1977)) who used Gardner's, "normative
belief technique" (see note 130 supra) experienced difficulty in operationalizing it and came to
realize that what they were measuring was not necessarily deception. Armstrong's "Salient
Deception Score" (see note 130 supra) seems to be the only approach so far developed that
actually measures deception. See note 144 infra.
132 This study chose to use the Listerine ad involved in Warner-Lambert v. FTC, 562 F.2d
749 for a variety of reasons. One of these is that it is the only corrective advertising case to go
to the courts. This study is more fully described in Gurol, Deception in Advertising: A Review
of Past and Current FTC Practice and an Experimental Evaluation of a New Approach 
for
Detecting Deception and a New Approach for Eradicating its Effects (1977) (an unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation in University of North Carolina Library).
133 It is important to distinguish between "persuasive information" and "objective 
informa-
tion." Persuasive information attempts to convince an audience of a certain 
aspect, i.e. one
side of a story. An example of persuasive information would be a company sponsored 
ad-
vertisement trying to convince consumers that Geritol is an omnipotent 
tiredness remedy for
women, while a corrective advertisement would be one stating that: "The producers 
of Geritol
were found guilty of trying to mislead the public by presenting Geritol 
as an omnipotent
tiredness remedy, although there is no basis for such a claim." An objective 
information
message would be a two-sided message stating both the positive and negative 
attributes. Ob-
jective information related to Geritol might be: "Geritol possesses a nutritive 
ingredient in
the form of iron. If an individual who suffers from iron deficiency used 
this preparation, he
or she may find them beneficial. However, tiredness may not be a symptom 
of iron deficiency,
nor is iron deficiency generally accompanied by tiredness symptoms."
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5. The effect of deceptive and objective information on advertiser and FTC
images.
A. Unique Aspects of Study
In this study of deceptive and remedial (corrective) advertising, a repeated
measures experimental design was used. This experiment has incorporated a
number of improvements over previous experiments in the deceptive/remedial
advertising area. The method used to measure deception and correction is a
more sensitized version of the technique used by Armstrong, Kendall, and Russe"
which appears to be the only approach devised yet which actually measures ad-
vertising deception. In addition, the repeated measures design used is composed
essentially of three "before-and-after with control" designs, which is one of the
best true experimental designs. 3
Unlike many of the previous experiments in corrective advertising which
used unfamiliar brands, this experiment used Listerine, a well known brand,
purchased currently or in the past by 61 percent of the subjects. Although
television commercials have been used frequently by the FTC in corrective ad-
vertising cases, this is the first experiment using a TV commercial film. (Others
used either print or audio messages.) Moreover, the film used for the deceptive
advertising treatment was professionally duplicated from the FTC's Listerine
case file." 6
134 Armstrong, supra note 130. According to the model used in this study, "a consumer is
considered to be deceived by a false claim if he perceives it and believes it. Such a deception,
however, does little harm unless it is salient-unless it affects the consumer's decision to buy the
product." Armstrong, supra note 130, at 235 (emphasis added).
135 Campbell and Stanley discuss sixteen experimental designs, but consider only three of
them "true experimental designs." The design used in this study ("Pretest/Posttest with
Control Group") is the first "true experimental design" they discuss, in which discussion they
emphasize the neat way in which it controls for the sources of internal invalidity. EXPERIMENTAL
AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (1963).
136 The television commercial used in this study is entitled "School Bus" and makes all
three claims found to be false by the FTC (i.e., Listerine will ameliorate, prevent and cure
colds and sore throats). It was professionally duplicated from the FTC files and is nearly
impossible for a nonprofessional to distinguish it from the original. The text of the film is:
SCHOOL BUS (60 Seconds)
[It is raining. Two mothers start talking. One mother has just escorted her children
to the school bus, the other (Muriel) is checking the mailbox.'
1st Mother Muriel, where is Dave and Sue?
2nd Mother Oh, down with a cold again.
Ist Mother Again?
2nd Mother Oh, guess your family always seems fine.
1st Mother I got a theory.
2nd Mother A theory? Nothing can prevent colds.
1st Mother You can help. Let's get out of the rain. [They go inside the house.]
1st Mother Muriel, I make sure they have plenty of rest, and I watch their diet.
2nd Mother Uhu!
1st Mother Then I have them gargle twice a day with Listerine.
2nd Mother Listerine antiseptic?
1st Mother Uhu, I think we've cut down on colds and those we catch, don't seem
to last as long.
2nd Mother Sure seems to work for your family.
1st Mother Yes it does.
2nd Mother Well, I'll try it.
Male Voice: During the cold catching season for fewer colds, milder colds, more




In corrective advertising experiments researchers have realized recently that
they should be using "beliefs" instead of "affects," but they have overlooked the
"salience" aspect of beliefs. This is the first remedial advertising study which
measures "saliences" along with brand attribute beliefs.1 1 7 Previous experiments
in remedial advertising have been cross-sectional,"'8 thereby failing to pay ap-
propriate attention to the time dimension. This is the first study to investigate
the persistence effects of both the deceptive and the remedial messages. Ex-
periments dealing with a public policy issue concerning carryover effects of
residual deceptive beliefs should also measure the persistence effect of the
remedial messages themselves.
This is one of the first times two-sided objective information messages which
give objective information about both negative and positive attributes of a
product have been used to eradicate the residual effects of deceptive advertise-
ments."' 9 At the same time, this experiment also assessed the effects of two-sided
objective information messages on company and FTC images.
B. Research Methodology
The subjects used in this experiment were 134 students enrolled at the Uni-
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. They were randomly divided into four
groups. A repeated-measures experimental design was used. Group I filled out a
questionnaire (M1 ) measuring the importance and beliefs about various product
claims, then watched a potentially deceptive advertisement film (T,), filled out
137 See discussion of "materiality" at text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
138 A cross-sectional design uses information from a one-time survey or from a single
period's observations. See TULL & HAWKINS, MARKETING RESEARCH 578 (1976).
139 The objective, two-sided information films used in this experiment for eradicating the
residual effects of the deceptive claims in the Listerine ad were professionally produced
especially for this experiment. Two films were produced-one for the company source and
the other for the FTC source. The objective information message from the company source
was as follows:
Hello, I am Walter Hughes (fictitious name), representing Warner-Lambert
Company, makers of Listerine.
Contrary to prior advertising of Listerine, Listerine will not prevent or cure
colds or sore throats, and Listerine will not be beneficial in the treatment of cold
symptoms or sore throats.
Listerine is an antiseptic which kills germs on contact. It is effective for general
oral hygiene, bad breath, minor cuts, scratches, insect bites and infectious dandruff.
But it is not effective against colds and cold symptoms, because colds are caused by
viruses and Listerine does not kill viruses.
The first paragraph of this message identifies the source of the message. The second paragraph
is from the final order of the FTC on the Listerine cases, specifying the negative attributes
of the product. See note 89 supra. This paragraph includes the "confessional preamble"
"contrary to prior advertising" because the study was conducted before the circuit court
announced its decision excising this phrase. See text accompanying notes 124-126 supra. In
the last paragraph, the first two sentences state the positive attributes of Listerine as presented
on the label of Listerine bottles. The final sentence explains the reasoning behind the negative
attributes mentioned above and is aimed at eradicating any residual effects that might still
exist in the minds of consumers due to the exposure to the deceptive advertisement or previous
beliefs. The message from the FTC source is similar except for the beginning: "Hello, I am
Walter Hughes of the Federal Trade Commission. The Federal Trade Commission has found
that contrary to. .. ."
In both instances the messages are not only objective-the FTC has medical evidence to
support the negative claims and Warner-Lambert has medical evidence to support the positive
claims-but also two-sided-three negative and six positive claims are made.
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a second questionnaire (M 2 ), watched a two-sided objective information film
about the product in the deceptive advertisement from the company source
(T 2), and then filled out a third questionnaire (M 3 ). Six weeks later, they filled
out a fourth questionnaire (M 4 ). Group II did the same except T 2 was a two-
sided objective information film from the FTC source. Group III was similar
to I and II, except T2 was an irrelevant advertisement (a dummy film). Group
IV had both T1 and T 2 as dummy films. This was the control groiip for detect-
ing effects of repeat measurements. (See Figure 1 for experimentalfdesign).
The potentially deceptive films were the "Listerine" advertisements 4 ° and
were included with two other advertisements (a "Ronco Noodles" ad and a
"GAC Finance Company" ad). The questions about Listerine were included
among questions about the other two advertisements in order to prevent the
subjects from realizing that the main interest was the Listerine advertisement.
In order to assess the effects of deceptive and two-sided objective informa-
tion messages on the company and the FTC images, subjects filled out semantic
differential scales'.' during the second (M 2 ) and third (M3 ) measurements.
The main dependent variable in this experiment was the "Salient Decep-
tion Score" (SDS). This measure was a modified version of the technique used
by Armstrong, Kendall, and Russ.' 42 An SDS was calculated for each false claim
by first multiplying the "belief score" of every subject by that subject's "salience
score" (importance of that claim in affecting that subject's decision to buy the
product), and then calculating the mean SDS score for the whole group.'
An additive model was used in which the mean SDS's of the claims were added
to find an SDS for the whole advertisement. 4 In addition, the effects of objec-
tive information messages on the company and FTC images were tested with a
series of semantic differential scales.
C. Findings
Analysis of the data 45 gathered by using the research methodology described
140 See note 136 supra.
141 In order to determine the effects of objective information messages on the company and
the FTC images a series of semantic differential scales containing attributes underlying a
firm's and an agency image were employed. The set of pairs of antonyms, the extremes of each
pair being separated by seven (assumed) equal intervals, related to powerfulness, warmness,
deliberateness, modernness, successfulness, outgoingness, and trustworthiness. The first four
attributes were chosen from an example in GREEN & TULL, RESEARCH FOR MARKETING
DECISIONS 194 (3d. ed. 1975). The last three came from Dyer, An Experimental Evaluation
of the Federal Trade Commission's Corrective Advertising Remedy at 143 (1972) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation in University of Maryland Library). Scores were assigned to the scale on
7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 basis with 7 being the positive extreme.
142 Armstrong, supra note 130.
143 The SDS scores were calculated using a one-to-sixteen scale. Each subject indicated
his belief in each claim as definitely true, probably true, probably false or definitely false.
These were coded 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively. Each subject indicated the importance
of each claim, in his decision to purchase the product as very important, moderately
important, slightly important or not at all important. These were coded 4, 3, 2, and 1,
respectively. Since the SDS is a product of these, it can range from 1 (1 x 1) to 16 (4 x 4).
144 Since there were three-false claims in the Listerine ad, the SDS score for the whole ad
could rangefrom 3(1 + 1 + 1) to48 (16 + 16 + 16).
145 In this study a single dependent variable (SDS) was measured four times on the same
subjects. Generally, such data are analyzed with a univariate analysis of variance which has
provision for correlated or repeated measurement. See, e.g., WINER, STATISTICAL PRINCIPLES
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above yielded several interesting findings.
1. The technique used to generate the SDS seems to detect deception quite
accurately.
2. The Listerine advertisement was found to be deceptive based upon the
changes in consumers' reported beliefs and saliences with regard to the
three product claims.146  (See Figure 2). This finding is consistent with
the conclusion of the administrative law judge,'47 the FTC148 and the
District of Columbia Circuit. 4 '
3. The kind of remedial message used (two-sided, objective information
messages which state both the negative and positive attributes of the
product) was highly effective in eradicating the residual effects of de-
ception." 0 (See Figure 2)'.
4. The data indicates that there was no significant difference' 5' in effective-
ness between supplying the objective information message from the company
or the FTC source. This held true both right after the message' 52 and over
a six-week period." 3 (See Figure 2.)
5. The company source, two-sided objective messages caused changes in
the negative direction with respect to some attributes and in the positive
direction with respect to other attributes. Overall, however, there appeared
to be no damage to the company's image." 4 (See Figure 3).
6. On the other hand, the changes in the company images indicated that
FTC source messages will likely damage the image of the company." 5 (See
Figure 4.)
V. Conclusions
The FTC should adopt an objective approach in detecting and correcting
deceptive advertising. Consumer surveys, although gaining somewhat greater
recognition and use," 5 have not been fully, nor appropriately, utilized by the
FTC for the purpose of providing such an objective approach. The findings in
IN EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 261-308, 514-603 (2d. ed. 1971). But in addition to the usual
assumptions concerning normality and homogeneity of variance within cells, Winer stresses that
repeated-measures analyses also require the assumption of homogeneity of covariances (i.e.,
correlations) between repeated assessments.
For repeated measures, such as those in this study, it is recommended that use be made
of multivariate techniques that make no covariance assumptions and provide exact probability
statements. McCall & Appelbaum, Bias in the Analysis of Repeated-Measures Designs: Some
Alternative Approaches, 44 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 401 (1973); KIRK, EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN:
PROCEDURES FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 143-44 (1968). These recommendations
were followed and multivariate analysis of variance was utilized to analyze the data.
146 Probability of this outcome occurring by chance is less than .001 (i.e., p < .001).
147 Warner-Lambert Co., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 20,776.
148 Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975).
149 562 F.2d 749.
150 p < .001.
151 Significant in the statistical sense. In order to determine whether results have any
statistical significance, it is useful to measure the extent to which the results could occur by
chance. This is expressed as a probability. The lower the probability, the more statistically
significant are the results. In social science research, levels of .05 or .01 are typically used as
cutoffs for statistical significance. See SNEDECOR & COCHRAN, STATISTICAL METHODS 28-30
(6th ed. 1967).
152 p < .283.
153 p < .597.
154 The overall change in company image had a probability of random occurrence of
.009 (p < .009). Note that this is very close to the cutoff for statistical significance.
155 The damage to the company's overall reputation was statistically significant. (p < .001).
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the study' described above suggest a number of ways in which the FTC (and
the advertisers..) can employ consumer surveys to better address the problems
presented by deceptive advertising and the need for corrective advertising.
The first way in which surveys may be used by the FTC is in its case selec-
tion. By measuring the Salient Deception Score of a relevant group,' the FTC
could make a better informed and more objective determination of the de-
ceptiveness of any suspected advertisement. This procedure requires the FTC to
establish a threshold SDS score for various products or product categories beyond
which an advertisement is considered deceptive. 6 It also requires the ex-
penditure of money to conduct the survey, but it is entirely conceivable that the
improvement in case selection, and consequent reduction in litigation expenses,
could offset this cost. Moreover, the existence of such objective proof of decep-
tiveness could bring about more consent orders by discouraging advertisers
from litigating.
If the matter proceeded to the administrative law judge, then proof of the
four elements of deceptive advertising would be required. 6 ' As discussed
above,"6 2 the use of a sufficiently broad sample will permit the extraction of a
subsample that coincides with the relevant group and the appropriate intelligence
level. Since the SDS score takes into consideration the meaning of the advertise-
ment, its falsity, and its materiality, the remaining three issues can be dealt with
simultaneously by establishing the threshold SDS score.
Secondly, consumer surveys could be used to select those deceptive advertis-
ing cases that required corrective advertising. The FTC's current standard for
imposing corrective advertising requires a finding that "a deceptive advertise-
ment has played a substantial role in creating or reinforcing in the public's mind
a false and material belief which lives on after the false advertisement
ceases. . . .""' This finding could be readily made by measuring the SDS score
after an appropriate period of time had elapsed to determine whether there were
157 It should be noted that this experiment (as do all experiments) has several limita-
tions. Two of these merit mention. First, since this was an experiment, the conditions
were somewhat unrealistic. The subjects were exposed to the message only once and
under forced exposure conditions (i.e., in a dark room with a TV commercial seen on a
movie screen). They did not have the opportunity to utilize selective exposure to the messages
which is common under normal conditions. In the real world, they would have had a chance
to watch a commercial many times over the years, but in the experiment, forced exposure was
necessarily employed in order to assess the effects of deceptive and remedial messages
without unduly diluting the effects of these treatments. One possible way to improve this
experiment would be to use the videotape of an actual TV program and to show the deceptive
and remedial ads during the commercial breaks. Were the subjects to view such a tape on TV
screens, the experiments would likely be more natural and realistic. Second, the subjects in
this experiment were all college students; it is not certain that nonstudents would respond in
the same manner.
158 Advertisers can use the methods proposed within during their copy-testing procedures
to identify potentially deceptive ads.
159 See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
160 The scope and significance of the possible harm would effect the level at which the
threshold of prohibited deception is established. As the Commission gains experience using
this method, these limits could and should be revised. See Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 570-72.
See also Gerlach, The Consumer's Mind: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Emerging Problems of
Consumer Evidence and the Law, MKTING. SCIENCE INSTITUTE 4-5 (1972) for a dis-
cussion of how the FTC should develop these standards.
161 See text accompanying notes 4-33 supra.
162 See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
163 Quoted in 562 F.2d 749. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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any residual effects of the advertisement.1 4
If corrective advertising were indicated, the results of this study have im-
plications for the terms of the corrective advertisement with respect to both dis-
closure and exposure. This study provides strong support for the use of two-
sided, objective remedial messages.'65 In fact, the advertiser could be allowed to
participate in the determination of the message, especially for the positive claims.
What is crucial is that both the positive and negative claims are objective and
supported by scientific evidence.
The experiment also indicates that there was no significant difference in
effectiveness between supplying objective information from the company or the
FTC."' Given the absence of any source effect and the additional finding that
use of the FTC source tended to damage the company's image, the FTC should
use a company source, objective message unless it intends for the corrective ad to
be punitive0 7 as well as remedial.
With respect to the exposure terms of the corrective advertisement, the SDS
measure could be used to introduce some rationality to determining the time
duration of corrective advertisements. Presently, the Commission arbitrarily
chooses some time period 0 8 or dollar amount of advertising." 9 The study in-
dicates that the SDS scores can be used to detect correction as well as deception.
Therefore, the exposure term could require the corrective advertisements to be
run until the residual deception is eradicated, as measured by the SDS score.17
Finally, the systematic use of the SDS measure over time can provide the
FTC with the means of assessing the effectiveness of the many facets of its
attempts to eliminate deceptive advertising.
To conclude, the FTC's use of an objective approach (entailing consumer
surveys designed to yield SDS's) to detect and correct deceptive advertising
would result in a significant improvement in the agency's regulation of ad-
vertising and, consequently, better protect consumers, honest businessmen, ad-
vertising effectiveness, and the public image of marketing in general.
164 Given the usual delay involved in the FTC's actions, the measured SDS would in most
cases reflect the residual effects, so no additional survey would be required. See text ac-
companying note 35 supra.
165 See text accompanying note 150 supra.
166 This is contrary to predictions made without empirical evidence that in government
information programs the prospects for effectiveness are likely to decrease to the extent that
"neutrality is preserved." See Wilkie, Applying Attitude Research in Public Policy, MKTING.
SCIENCE INSTITUTE (1975).
167 The District of Columbia Circuit's opinion does not preclude the punitive use of cor-
rective advertising. The court stated:
We believe the preamble "Contrary to prior advertising" is not necessary. It
can serve only two purposes: either to attract attention that a correction follows
or to humiliate the advertiser. The Commission claims only the first purpose for it,
and this we think is obviated by the other terms of the order. The second purpose,
if it were intended, might be called for in an egregious case of deliberate deception,
but this is not one. While we do not decide whether petitioner proferred its cold
claims in good faith or bad, the record compiled could support a finding of good
faith. On these facts, the confessional preamble to the disclosure is not warranted.
562 F.2d at 763. The court added in a footnote that "[w]e express no view on the question
whether an order intended to humiliate the wrongdoer would be so punitive as to be outside
the Commission's proper authority." Id. at n. 69.
168 See text accompanying notes 64-67 supra.
169 See text accompanying note 89 supra.
170 The advertiser subject to the corrective ad order would have sufficient monetary in-
centive to finance the independent, nonpartisan surveys required by this procedure.
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